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Abstract Latin America is quickly approaching fertility replacement levels. Although the pace of 
fertility decline has been uneven across countries, recent data show that more than half 
of the 20 Latin American countries had total fertility rates close to or below replacement 
levels by 2005. Until now, a distinctive feature of the process of fertility decline in Latin 
America was that it took place without major changes in the onset of family formation, as 
indicated by fairly stable rates and ages at first union and first birth. It seems, however, that 
Latin America has entered into a new stage of the fertility decline process in recent years. 
After decomposing childbearing into the contributions of (1) entry into motherhood and 
(2) children that mothers have, we detect a new fertility pattern in the region: the age-30 
proportion of mothers, which had changed little in the past, has dropped substantially in 
Latin America in the 1990s, suggesting that the social imperative of early motherhood, which 
has long prevailed in the region, is weakening. The analysis is based on cohort estimates 
from the four waves of Latin American censuses between 1970 and 2000. In addition, surveys 
conducted in 14 Latin American countries in 2006 show a strong link between childlessness 
and higher education across several cohorts. We discuss whether the recent increase in 
childlessness reflects a shift towards later childbearing or whether it may signal an emerging 
retreat from universal childbearing in the region. In turn, the data show that the decline of 
fertility of mothers continues, although slowly.
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Introduction 
Latin America is quickly approaching fertility replacement levels. Although the 
pace of fertility decline has been uneven across countries5 (Guzmán et al., 1996), 
recent data show that more than half of the 20 Latin American countries had total 
fertility rates (TFR) close to or below replacement levels by 2005 (Population Reference 
Bureau 2007). This group includes the four largest countries in the region: Brazil, 
Mexico, Colombia, and Argentina; as well as five countries with populations that 
have already crossed the replacement threshold (with TFR lower than 2.1): Uruguay, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. Fertility patterns and trends at these low 
levels may be strongly determined by women’s behavior in entering maternity; that 
is, by rates of first births and age schedules. If motherhood continues to be almost 
universal and early, it seems unlikely that the region will eventually reach the very 
low fertility levels observed in several European and East Asian countries (Kohler, 
Billari, and Ortega, 2002). Conversely, if larger proportions of Latin Americans opt to 
have their first child at older ages, or to remain childless, the region could reach very 
low fertility levels sooner rather than later.
Until now, a distinctive feature of the process of fertility decline in Latin America 
was that it took place without major changes in the onset of family formation, as 
indicated by fairly stable rates and ages at first union and first birth  (Rosero-Bixby, 
1996, 2004; Mensch, Singh, and Casterline, 2005). It seems, however, that Latin 
America has entered into a new stage of the fertility decline process in recent years. 
The proportion of women under 30 who have made the transition to motherhood 
has dropped significantly in most Latin American countries in the past decade. In 
Costa Rica, for example, the estimated proportion of women who would be mothers 
by age 30, according to the rates of the study year, fell from above 80% to about 
65% from 1995 to 2005. Drawing on the European experience, this article discusses 
whether this reduction in rates of motherhood among young adults reflects a 
novel shift in the starting age of childbearing, an emerging retreat from universal 
childbearing, or a combination of both.
The study of childlessness among younger groups adds a complementary 
perspective to earlier research. Previous studies on childlessness in developing 
countries have been traditionally confined to the end of the reproductive span; i.e., 
among women in the oldest reproductive age groups, usually over age 40. Based 
5 For example, Mexico and Brazil have experienced a rapid and sharp fertility transition over the last thirty years; Chile, 
Uruguay and Argentina already displayed a relatively low level of fertility in the 1970s and the reduction in fertility 
rates has been moderate thereafter. In Guatemala, Bolivia, Honduras, Paraguay and Nicaragua, fertility rates remain 
relatively high at present (United Nations, 2007).
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on the assumption that the desire for children is practically universal in developing 
countries, childlessness has been typically attributed to involuntary infecundity. 
The comparison of data from the World Fertility Surveys and the Demographic and 
Health Surveys reveals that permanent childlessness has diminished in Latin America 
since the 1970s (United Nations, 2004). However, the proportion of childless women 
aged 25 to 49 has recently increased in several countries of the region (Rutstein, and 
Shah, 2004), suggesting that childbearing is intentionally postponed (or foregone) 
by an increasing proportion of young adults. 
This article documents the levels and trends of childlessness among young 
adult women in 16 Latin American countries between 1970 and 2000 with data from 
four waves of population censuses. It also identifies factors that are associated with 
childlessness using individual-level data from a 2006 series of surveys conducted in 
14 Latin American countries. The article focuses primarily on cohort fertility, given 
that it has been shown that period indicators of fertility may be distorted by what 
Ryder called “demographic translation” effects (Ryder, 1964), also known as tempo 
effects in more recent literature (Bongaarts, and Feeney, 1998). For example, while 
period total fertility rates are as low as 1.2 and 1.3 in several European countries, 
the lowest estimates of complete cohort fertility in those countries are in the order 
of 1.5 to 1.7 births among cohorts born circa 1970 (Sardon, 2006). The persistent 
postponement of births biases downwards the estimates of period fertility rates 
because there can be a recuperation of fertility at older ages. However, it is well 
documented that, in general, “later means fewer” children (Rindfuss, and Bumpass, 
1976), or even no children.
The Latin American demographic context 
Considering the far-reaching economic, social, and political transformations 
that Latin America experienced in the second half of the 20th century, it remains 
somewhat of a puzzle that demographic indicators of family formation, such as age 
at first union and age at first birth, have shown, until very recently, so little change 
(Heaton, Forste, and Otterstrom, 2002). During these past decades, major structural 
transformations affected the organization of society, particularly the expansion of 
mass education, rapid urbanization, and internal rural to urban migration, as well 
as the transition to democratic governments in the political domain. Women’s 
education and employment levels, which are known to influence family formation, 
also increased rapidly during this period. For example, the participation of women in 
the labor force increased from around 20% in the 1950s to over 50% in the 1990s, albeit 
with large differences according to country, area of residence, age and educational 
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level  (ECLAC, 2007). The increase was particularly sharp after the debt crisis that 
affected the region in the 1980s, and the subsequent economic restructuring of the 
1990s. The deterioration of the economy, increasing unemployment, and precarious 
attachment to the labour force rendered the traditional male breadwinner family 
model unsustainable (Jelin, and Díaz-Muñoz, 2003). Despite these trends, early life 
course transitions, such as the transition to first union and motherhood, changed 
remarkably little (Fussell, 2005).
Fertility in the Latin American region as a whole declined from 5.9 births per 
woman in 1950-1955 to 2.5 in 2000-2005 (United Nations, 2007). However, as 
mentioned above, this rapid and sustained process of fertility decline was not 
accompanied by a gradual delay in the onset of childbearing, as has been the norm 
in European countries (Sobotka, 2004). In the early 1990s, relatively low fertility 
coexisted with traditional patterns of family formation –i.e., early nuptiality and 
young motherhood– in many Latin American countries. Fussell and Palloni (2004) 
argue that the explanation for this distinct Latin American pattern6 lies in the strong 
cultural emphasis on family ties. According to these authors, the value placed on 
family networks, which represent the primary safety net guarding against economic 
and social instability, would explain the persistence of nearly universal and early 
family formation, despite major changes in the economic, political, and social 
spheres.
Traditional patterns are, however, not immutable, and it is reasonable to 
expect that behavior regarding motherhood will eventually change in the face of 
modernizing forces, such as women’s education and salaried work, particularly when 
the average desired family size has declined to about two children in most Latin 
American countries (Westoff, and Bankole, 2002). Younger cohorts, particularly if 
they have had access to higher education, are likely to reach adulthood with different 
aspirations regarding marriage and family, work life, economic self-sufficiency, and 
lifestyle than their mothers and grandmothers, as has occurred in Western societies 
(Crimmins, Easterlin and, Saito 1991). Delaying childbearing could be a suitable 
strategy that allows them to pursue higher education, establish themselves in the 
labour market, build their couple relationship before child-rearing, and also to deal 
with unstable life conditions or uncertainty in the economic context (Adsera, and 
Menéndez, 2006).
6 Fertility patterns in Eastern Europe also reflect the atypical coexistence of very low fertility and early transition to 
childbearing, but an upward trend towards later motherhood has recently started (Council of Europe, 2005).
luis rosero-bixby, teresa castro-martín anD teresa martín-garcía 223
Data and methods 
Drawing on the classic study of the decline of fertility in Europe that decomposed 
childbearing into marriage and marital fertility indexes (Coale, and Watkins, 1986), 
the starting point in this article is the following identity that decomposes total 
fertility F into two different processes: 
1. the proportion of women who became mothers, or motherhood rate M, and 
2. the fertility of mothers, or G rate, which is simply the additional number of 
children that mothers have:  
F = M(G+1)
Our trend analysis is based on cohort estimates of F and M from the four waves 
of censuses conducted in 16 Latin American countries since 1970. The G rate is 
derived from the above identity. We focus on M at ages 25-29, which the data shows 
represents 87% (5% SD) of complete M in Latin America (cohorts in these data reach 
complete M by age 40). And we focus on G in the age bracket 30-34, which includes 
80% (5% SD) of complete G in each cohort. In some analyses, we estimate complete 
M and G for cohorts born in the 1970s from the quasi-complete figures at ages 25-
29 and 30-34, respectively, using relations derived from the data. The census data 
were taken from several sources, including the UN Demographic Yearbook, as well 
as online census data on the web from the IPUMS project (Minnesota Population 
Center, 2008), the University of Costa Rica (CCP, 2008), and the census offices in 
Colombia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Honduras. 
This decomposition of fertility in M and G was used in an earlier study of the 
prospects of below-replacement fertility in 15 metropolitan areas of Latin America 
(Rosero-Bixby, 2004).  For comparison purposes, we also use the most recent 
estimates of cohorts M and G for 22 European countries, which correspond to the 
cohorts born circa 1970. The lowest estimates of cohort total fertility in this group 
of European countries are in the order of 1.5 to 1.7 births. The estimates come from 
the European Demographic Observatory (Sardon, 2006), and the countries are: 
Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, England and Wales, Finland, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden (countries with no available 
estimates for 1970s cohorts were not considered). In addition, we use published 
cohort estimates of completed-M and M at age 27 for five cohorts in 23 developed 
countries (Frejka, and Sardon, 2007) to identify an intra-cohort relationship between 
these two figures, which  we then use to estimate a scenario of completed-M in the 
1970s birth cohorts in Latin America.
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In order to examine in more detail recent trends in motherhood rates, we use 
vital statistics data on first births in Chile and Costa Rica in the period 1980-2006. 
These are the only countries in the region with accessible and reliable series of 
numbers of births by birth order. We estimate the time series of period-M at age 30 
(sum of age specific first birth rates), as well as the period median age at motherhood 
(i.e., when 50% of women reach motherhood) in these two countries.
In complementary analyses of factors associated with childlessness, we use 
micro-data from surveys conducted in 14 Latin American countries in 2006 as 
part of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP, 2008) of the “Americas 
Barometer” of the Vanderbilt University7. These are nationally representative surveys 
of adult women and men aged 18 and over, with a sample size of around 1,500 
in each country. The questions mainly focus on political themes, such as voting 
participation, tolerance, and support of democracy, and citizens’ rights. However, 
by including questions on the number of children and socioeconomic status, these 
surveys offer a rare opportunity for comparing the co-factors of the prevalence 
of childlessness in several cohorts and across 14 Latin American countries. Using 
logistic regression, this article estimates cross-sectional effects on the probability of 
being childless, contrasting results across three age or cohort groups (women aged 
20-29, 30-39, and 40-49 in 2006). The covariates included in the model are: urban 
residence, educational level, occupation, household wealth (a zero to one scale built 
by counting up to 11 household assets), religion and religiosity, trust in neighbors 
(an indicator of social capital measured with a zero to one scale), satisfaction with 
life (an indicator of self- perceived wellbeing measured with a zero to one scale), 
and sources of news, since some authors postulate an important role of television 
(telenovelas, in particular) for the diffusion of modern lifestyles and family values in 
Latin America (Potter, Schmertmann, and Cavenaghi, 2002). Age and marital status 
are included as controls, and interactions between age and several covariates are 
also explored.
Results 
Figure 1 (Part B) shows the remarkable drop in the G rate or fertility of mothers from 
cohorts aged 30 to 34 in the 1970 wave of censuses (born around 1940), to analogous
7 The countries are Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, and the Dominican Republic.
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 cohorts in the 2000 censuses born around 1970. At these ages, about 80% of the final G 
fertility of the cohort is usually completed in Latin America. The oldest cohorts were at 
Figure 1. M proportion and G rate in Latin American countries over four census waves, 1970-2000
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their peak reproductive ages in the 1960s, and the youngest cohorts reached these 
ages in the 1990s. Most countries went from a G rate of four or five children to a 
rate of around two children in these 30 years. The exceptions are, on the one hand, 
Argentina and Uruguay, which already had G rates of about two births from 1970 
onwards; and, on the other hand, Honduras and Guatemala, the only countries with 
G rates higher than three births in 2000.
Trends are different in the proportion M of motherhood in the 25-29 age bracket 
(Figure 1, Part A), when close to 90% of the final cohort-M is usually completed 
in Latin America. First, there is no clear pattern of change from 1970 to 1990. In 
some countries, such as Chile and Peru, there are declines of about 10 percentage 
points in M, whereas in most countries, including the four regional giants, Brazil, 
Mexico, Argentina and Colombia, the M change from 1970 to 1990 is only about 
two percentage points in any direction. In contrast, between the last two waves of 
censuses, from 1990 to 2000, there is a clear drop in M in almost all countries. With 
the exceptions of the Dominican Republic and Paraguay, the M proportion reached 
its historic low in the 2000 wave of censuses.
Period indicators of M illustrate these trends more sharply. Figure 2 shows 
the evolution over time in the period-M at age 30 and the period median age of 
entry into motherhood in Chile and Costa Rica, the only Latin American countries 
with readily available series that are sufficiently long. Three points emerge from 
Figure 2: 
1. there are no clear trends before 1990; 
2. starting in about 1990, there is a clear increase of almost three years in the 
median age at first birth over a period of about 10 years; and 
3. there is a sharp drop of almost 20 percentage points in M in the decade of 
1990. 
The M proportion of mothers is below 65% at the end of the series. 
Considering that, in the past, no more than 10% of women entered motherhood 
after age 30, this might imply that as many as one in four women could end her 
reproductive life childless. This is, however, a naïve interpretation of a period-M 
that may be down-biased by the shift in tempo of first birth. It is plausible that 
women will enter motherhood after age 30 in significantly higher proportions 
than in the past if recent changes are driven mostly by a temporal postponement 
of the first birth.
Returning to the census-based cohort estimates of G and M, in order to include 
younger cohorts (born in the 1970s) in trend analyses, we completed the final 10 years 
of the G rate for cohorts born around 1970 (observed until about age 32), as well as the 
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Figure 2. Trend in motherhood proportion at age 30 and median age at motherhood.  
 Period rates in Costa Rica and Chile, 1980-2005
final 10 years of the M proportion for women born around 1975 (observed until 
about age 27 in the 2000 wave of censuses). To complete the cohort G rate, we 
estimated a simple regression model with G in the same cohort 10 years earlier as 
the predictor variable, using fixed effects estimates in the panel of 16 Latin American 
countries. The resulting equation for a cohort c was (standard errors in parentheses):
To complete M, we followed the same procedure as Frejka and Sardon (2007), 
and assumed that the rate in the coming 10 years would be the same as in the 
previous 10-year period in the same country and ages. However, this assumption 
corresponds to a traditional scenario in which very low proportions of women 
commence childbearing in their thirties, which had been the pattern until recently. 
It is quite plausible that women in younger cohorts who did not start childbearing 
in their twenties will do so in their thirties, resulting in substantially higher rates of 
late transition to motherhood similar to those seen in Europe. We thus assumed, 
as an alternative scenario, that young Latin American cohorts will display the same 
behavior as their European counterparts. Based on this assumption, we completed 
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the M proportion with a relationship derived from the panel data for 23 countries 
and five cohorts in the Frejka and Sardon (2007) article, Tables 1 and 3. The resulting 
European equation, estimated with a fixed effect regression model in the logits, for 
a cohort c was8:
Figure 3 shows the box plots9 for complete G and M in the 16 Latin American 
countries and in each of the four census waves, plus our prediction for the wave of 
2010 (two scenarios for M). These are cohort estimates of quasi-complete G and M, 
which will be observed in the census wave of 2010 for the 1970 cohorts. The figure 
also includes boxes of G and M for 22 European countries, with available estimates 
for cohorts born around 1970. It also shows the M box in the hypothetical scenario 
that the 1975 cohort would complete M with high rates of late motherhood, like 
in Europe. Overall, this figure confirms the precipitous decline in G from cohorts 
born around 1930 (median of 5.7 births) to those born around 1960 (median of 2.6 
births). This decline has somehow stalled for the cohorts born about 1970 (median 
2.3 births) at a level well above the European median of about one birth per mother 
in the 1970 cohorts. 
For the complete M proportion –the main focus in this article–no clear 
trend can be seen when we move from the 1935 cohorts to the 1965 cohorts. 
The median M hovers above 90% motherhood, although in the 1965 cohorts 
there are signs that a decline has started. In contrast, the cohorts born by 1975 
seem to be heading towards lower M (median of 86%), close to the M level in the 
European cohorts of 1970 (median of 83%). However, as indicated by the dashed 
box in the figure, if the 1975 cohorts have been simply delaying the onset of 
childbearing, and can be expected to have their first birth in their thirties, as in 
Europe, complete-M (median of 91%) will change little, and will stay above 90% 
median value. In this scenario, the only change will therefore be in the age at first 
birth. Reality may follow a path between these two scenarios, with a median M 
between 86% and 91%. Colombia is an extreme case, showing large differences 
between the two scenarios. Only 70% of women aged 25-29 were mothers in the 
2005 census (our 1975 birth cohort), compared to 82% of the 1965 cohort in the 
8 Since the R-squared of 0.55 in the prediction equation is less than optimal for forecasting purposes, we consider this 
as just an alternative scenario. 
9 The line in the middle of the box indicates the median value of the distribution; the extremes of the box indicate the 
25 and 75 percentiles.
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Figure 3. Trend in the approximately final G and M in five cohorts of 16 Latin 
 American countries and in the 1970 cohort of 22 European countries
1993 census. Our estimates of the completed M for the 1975 cohort range from 
77%, if we assume the continuation of the 1965 cohort first birth rates, to 90%, if we 
assume the adoption of first birth patterns similar to those of Europe.
To what extent are M and G related to each other? Is fertility of second and higher 
order births influenced by the rate of entrance into motherhood? Lower M usually 
means later age at first birth and a reduced exposure time for having second and 
higher order births. This exposure effect would be strong in a natural fertility setting. 
But even under perfectly controlled fertility conditions, later may mean fewer births, 
particularly for the tail of the age distribution of women who start childbearing by age 
40. However, if a lower M comes from a retreat from reproduction by large numbers 
of couples, further fertility of those who choose to have children may or may not be 
lower than in the previous situation, in which women with low fertility desires were 
part of the pool of mothers. If there is a general reduction in fertility preferences, 
a reduced M will go hand-in-hand with a reduced G. If, however, in some societies 
there is a divide between couples who opt out of parenthood and couples more 
oriented towards family and children, we will not observe an association between G 
and M, or the association may even be inverse.
Figure 4 shows the cross-sectional associations between the national levels of 
M and G in five successive Latin American cohorts and a recent European cohort. It 
is clear from the figure that the association between these two fertility components 
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has changed over time. If we exclude the outliers Argentina and Uruguay from 
cohorts born in the 1930s and 1940s, there is almost no association between G 
and M in these cohorts. A positive and clear association takes shape in more recent 
generations of women, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s cohorts. However, the 
association weakens in the 1970s cohorts10. Moreover, an inverse relationship can 
be observed in the 1970s European cohorts: in societies with a lower proportion 
of women who are mothers, the fertility of mothers tends to be higher. This inverse 
association seems peculiar at first. However, it may simply mean that when M falls 
below a certain threshold, those women with lower fertility preferences are removed 
from the pool of mothers; that is, women who would have one child at most may be 
the ones who opt out of motherhood, leaving a self-selected group of women with 
higher fertility preferences in the pool of mothers, which, consequently, results in a 
higher G-rate.
What factors increase the likelihood of being childless (even if only temporarily) 
among young adults? Do these factors act differently than in earlier cohorts? Table 
1 shows the results of a multivariate analysis on the probability of being childless 
among the 9,000 respondents of the LAPOP surveys of the Americas Barometer 
2006. We present separate models for all women aged 20-49, and for each of the 10-
year age brackets; i.e., for 10-year cohorts with central birth years at 1980, 1970, and 
1960. All models include controls for age and country. 
As expected, there is a clear and positive effect of education on childlessness 
(Castro-Martín, and Juarez, 1995). College-educated women are about four 
times more likely to be childless than women with no education or incomplete 
elementary school. This effect does not differ much in young and old cohorts. 
Working women, in turn, are twice as likely as housewives to be childless, but this 
effect is present and significant only in younger cohorts. However, the direction 
of causality in this relationship cannot be determined from the available data; i.e., 
we cannot tell whether women are childless because they are in the labor force, 
or whether they are more likely to be in the labor force because they are childless. 
Women who get the news mostly from newspapers are more likely to be childless, 
whereas the opposite occurs among women who get the news mostly from TV. 
The model does not show clear effects on childlessness based on residence in 
urban or metropolitan areas once we control for education, or from the indicators 
of social capital in the community (measured by the trust scale). Contrary to 
10 The scatter graph for the 1970 cohort M that was predicted with the European relationship differs little from the one 
shown in Figure 4. The correlation coefficient is 0.70, compared to 0.71 in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Cross-sectional relationships between G and M. Latin American (LA) countries  
 cohorts 1930-1970 and Europe cohort 1970
Note: The two outliers in 1930 are Argentina and Uruguay; the outlier in 1940 is Argentina. 
R is the correlation coefficient (excluding the outliers).
the popular view that religious affiliation and church attendance have a strong 
influence on women’s fertility behavior in Latin America, our data show no effect of 
these factors on childlessness. 
The effects on childlessness of the scales of wealth and satisfaction with life 
deserve a closer look. The odds ratios show that the direction of these effects 
reversed in younger cohorts.  This change of direction is statistically significant, as 
shown by the interaction effects included in the all ages model. The findings indicate 
that women who are wealthier or more satisfied with life are less likely to be childless 
in older cohorts, and are more likely to be childless in younger cohorts. Among 
younger women, going from zero to one on the wealth scale increases the odds of 
being childless almost threefold, whereas among older cohorts, it reduces the odds 
to about one-third. Regarding satisfaction with life, going from zero to one on the 
scale more than doubles the odds of being childless among younger women, and 
reduces the odds by 30% among older women. If these were truly cohort effects, 
as opposed to age effects, they would stand for a dramatic generational change: 
childlessness now seems linked to happiness and wealth, in contrast to the trends 
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Table 1. Logistic regressions on the probability of being childless.
 LAPOP-2006 surveys, in 14 Latin American countries
Total Age 20-29 Age 30-39 Age 40-49
Explanatory variables Odds Ratio P>|z|
Odds 
Ratio P>|z|
Odds 
Ratio P>|z|
Odds 
Ratio P>|z|
(N) (8,925) (3,717) (2,802) (2,406)
Marital status  
With no couple 1 Ref. 1.00 Ref. 1 Ref. 1 Ref.
Common law union 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.16 0.00
Married 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.00
Place of residence  
Metropolitan 0.89 0.29 0.77 0.07 1.15 0.58 1.22 0.50
Other Urban 0.80 0.07 0.77 0.09 1.13 0.66 0.59 0.16
Rural 1 Ref. 1.00 Ref. 1 Ref. 1 Ref.
Education  
Incomplete elementary 1 Ref. 1.00 Ref. 1 Ref. 1 Ref.
Completed elementary 1.44 0.04 1.24 0.36 1.66 0.17 1.82 0.12
High school 1.70 0.00 1.70 0.01 1.58 0.15 1.78 0.10
College 3.72 0.00 4.06 0.00 3.61 0.00 5.19 0.00
Occupation  
Housewife 1 Ref. 1.00 Ref. 1 Ref. 1 Ref.
White-collar / student 2.03 0.00 2.69 0.00 1.26 0.32 0.94 0.83
Blue-collar 1.48 0.00 1.71 0.00 1.11 0.63 1.37 0.21
Religion  
Catholic 1 Ref. 1.00 Ref. 1 Ref. 1 Ref.
No Catholic 1.08 0.45 1.21 0.13 0.74 0.20 1.17 0.55
No religion 1.03 0.83 1.26 0.25 0.79 0.51 0.55 0.34
Church attendance  
Weekly vs. less than weekly 1.09 0.30 1.11 0.33 0.82 0.28 1.28 0.27
Trust scale (0 - 1) 1.08 0.55 1.07 0.70 0.84 0.53 1.25 0.54
TV informed scale  (0 - 1) 0.62 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.66 0.18 0.77 0.48
Paper informed scale  (0 - 1) 1.42 0.01 1.37 0.06 1.47 0.16 1.43 0.29
Satisfied with life scale (0 - 1) 2.26 0.00 2.23 0.00 1.63 0.17 0.71 0.44
Wealth scale (0 - 1) 2.85 0.00 2.97 0.00 4.33 0.00 0.31 0.05
Age groups and interactions  
20-29 1 Ref.  
30-39 1.22 0.62  
40-49 9.43 0.00  
Life satisfaction and  
Age 30-39 0.58 0.17  
Age 40-49 0.35 0.02  
Wealth and  
Age 30-39 1.23 0.61  
Age 40-49 0.24 0.00            
Note: All regressions included controls for age (continuous) and country (13 dummy variables). 
Source: LAPOP surveys project data online at http://encuestas.ccp.ucr.ac.cr/Lapop.html.
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seen only a generation ago, in which childless women reported being less happy and 
less wealthy. Nevertheless, we should interpret these cross-sectional relationships 
with caution because of possible reverse causality and the confounding effects of 
age and cohort.
Figure 5 re-examines the robust effect of education on the motherhood 
proportion M among women aged 25-29 using data from the two most recent 
censuses in nine Latin American countries. The educational gap in M is large and 
persistent over time. Having a college education seems particularly important for 
two reasons: (1) the M gap for college is larger than for lower educational levels, 
and (2) college-educated women are the only group with a clear reduction in M 
over time in the nine countries. In Costa Rica, for example, only 43% of women 
aged 25-29 who attended college are mothers in the 2000 census, compared to 
76% and 84% of women with high school and primary education, respectively. 
Moreover, in this country, the proportion of mothers among college-educated 
women fell 15 percentage points from the 1984 to the 2000 census, whereas the 
M proportion remained fairly stable in the other two educational groups. Among 
college-educated women, M dropped 14 percentage points in Panama, 11 points in 
Mexico, nine points in Colombia, seven points in Argentina and Brazil, five points in 
Nicaragua, and one point in Venezuela. 
Therefore, the fall in the M proportion among women with college education 
seems to be a key factor in understanding the emerging retreat from childbearing 
in Latin America observed in recent years. Another key factor in understanding this 
trend is the growing numbers of women receiving a college education. In the age 
bracket 25-29, the percentage of women who attended college increased in the last 
two censuses by 18 points in Chile; 15 points in Colombia; 10 points in Venezuela; 
eight points in Argentina, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua; but only one to three points in 
Panama, Brazil, and Mexico (Table 2). In the 2000 wave of censuses, college-educated 
women in this age bracket range from low levels of 11% in Brazil and 14% in Mexico 
and Nicaragua, to highs of 32% in Argentina and Chile, and 27% in Colombia and 
Venezuela.
In a quick exercise to estimate the impact of the changing educational 
composition on M, we computed for the nine countries in Figure 5 a hypothetical 
M for the 2000 census wave, assuming that the educational composition was 
that of the 1990 census wave. The result of this exercise is presented in Table 2, 
and suggests that educational improvement might be responsible for all of the 
observed national change in M in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela; and for 
about half of the M change in Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Nicaragua. In other 
words, about half the decline in M in these four countries (and 80% in Panama) 
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comes from M reductions within educational groups, mostly among women with 
a college education, meaning that factors other than the improvement in women’s 
education may also need to be considered if we are to fully understand the recent 
decline in M.
Figure 5. Motherhood proportion M at age 25-29 by education in the two most recent  
 censuses, selected countries
If the recent enhancement in women’s education explains a significant portion 
of the recent drop in the percentage of women who become mothers, why then 
did past educational improvements not produce a similar result? The answer might 
be that educational improvements in the past occurred mostly at the primary and 
secondary levels and, as Figure 5 suggests, in most countries there are only small 
differences in M at these lower educational levels. It is college education that seems 
to make a difference in the timing and level of transition to motherhood.
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Table 2. Educational composition and M proportion in women aged 25-29 
 in the two most recent censuses
Country 
year
Educational composition of women M proportion
None/ 
elementary
High 
school
College Total
None / 
elementary
High 
school
College Total
Argentina
1991 50 25 25 100 0.81 0.65 0.43 0.67
2001 38 30 32 100 0.85 0.65 0.36 0.63
Percent M-change explained by education 100
Brazil
1991 67 23 10 100 0.80 0.59 0.38 0.71
2000 60 29 11 100 0.82 0.58 0.31 0.69
Percent M-change explained by education 100
Chile
1992 37 48 15 100 0.86 0.77 0.51 0.76
2002 23 45 32 100 0.88 0.81 0.47 0.72
Percent M-change explained by education 100
Colombia
1993 56 32 12 100 0.89 0.81 0.51 0.82
2005 26 47 27 100 0.85 0.78 0.43 0.70
Percent M-change explained by education 63
Costa Rica
1984 52 34 14 100 0.85 0.76 0.58 0.78
2000 48 31 21 100 0.84 0.76 0.43 0.73
Percent M-change explained by education 51
Mexico
1990 56 32 12 100 0.87 0.74 0.50 0.78
2000 39 47 14 100 0.85 0.74 0.39 0.73
Percent M-change explained by education 51
Nicaragua
1995 58 35 7 100 0.90 0.82 0.57 0.85
2005 52 34 14 100 0.88 0.81 0.52 0.80
Percent M-change explained by education 50
Panama
1990 32 46 21 100 0.91 0.84 0.58 0.81
2000 31 45 24 100 0.89 0.81 0.44 0.75
Percent M-change explained by education 19
Venezuela
1990 54 29 17 100 0.88 0.74 0.45 0.76
2001 46 27 27 100 0.88 0.76 0.44 0.73
Percent M-change explained by education 100
Discussion 
This article documents the growing proportion of Latin American women in 
their twenties and early thirties who have not made the transition to motherhood. 
This emerging trend certainly means a shift in the region toward a later onset 
of childbearing, but it could also mean that some women are choosing to 
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forgo having children. Until recently, one of the singular demographic features 
of the region was that rapid and sustained fertility decline occurred without 
a concomitant change in the timing of union formation, or in the onset of 
childbearing. Early and almost universal childbearing persisted in spite of radical 
changes in the demographic, economic, social, and political spheres. There is, 
however, recent evidence that young cohorts are departing from this traditional 
pattern, and that Latin American women are waiting longer to become mothers. 
Although age at first birth had remained fairly stable since the 1970s, the data 
presented from the 2000 wave of censuses reveals that the proportion of women 
aged 25 to 29 who are still childless increased in almost all the countries analyzed. 
Data from vital statistics for Chile and Costa Rica also corroborate this new trend 
towards later motherhood. 
The emerging trend in postponement of childbearing raises the question 
of whether this development will lead to an increase in the region in permanent 
childlessness –voluntarily chosen or because of age-related infecundity– as has 
been the case in European countries countries (González, and Jurado-Guerrero, 
2006; Tanturri, and Mencarini, 2008). Our estimates of the proportion of women 
born in 1975 who will eventually become mothers are not conclusive: an important 
drop could take place if these women follow the traditional pattern of low rates of 
transition to motherhood beyond age 30, but no significant drop would take place if 
there is a recovery with high rates of transition to motherhood among women in their 
thirties, as in many European countries. Nevertheless, the increase in childlessness 
in the customarily prime ages of reproduction (25 to 29), even if transitory, deserves 
attention. It signals an important change in societies where the social imperative 
of motherhood has been traditionally strong, and where women who wished to 
postpone their first birth or remain childless were commonly stigmatized as selfish. 
Latin American cultural constructions of femininity have been strongly influenced by 
women’s symbolic and social roles as mothers (Jelin, 1990). Nowadays, motherhood 
continues to play a central role in women’s lives, but there has been an expansion 
of women’s non-familial identities and roles, possibly rendering the deferment of 
childbearing an acceptable option. 
Beyond the normative context, economic constraints and competing 
opportunities are also likely to play a major role in shaping decisions and behaviors 
regarding childbearing. In the face of enhanced female labor market prospects, 
increased economic insecurity, or rising conjugal instability, delayed childbearing 
might become an increasingly common strategy for dealing with uncertainty, as has 
occurred in Europe (Billari, Liefbroer, and Philipov, 2006). The impact of economic 
instability on family formation, as well as variations in the perception, tolerance, 
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and reactions to economic insecurity across educational strata and social contexts, 
deserve further attention (Bernardi, Klärner, and Lippe, 2008).
It is not evident whether these changes should be interpreted under the lens of 
the second demographic transition (van de Kaa, 1987). The validity of that framework 
to explain recent family changes in Latin America is at the center of contemporary 
debates (Quilodrán, 1999; García, and Rojas, 2001). Divergent views persist on 
whether to interpret recent family dynamics as an outcome of diffusion processes of 
new cultural patterns, or as a reflection of the lack of social cohesion within excluded 
sectors (Arriagada,  2002). Some demographic features of Latin American societies, 
such as the high prevalence of consensual unions or frequent union disruption, 
can be linked to either modernity or tradition, depending on the social group we 
focus on (Castro-Martín, 2002). The delayed onset of childbearing can, however, be 
unequivocally labelled as innovative behavior. Furthermore, our education-specific 
trend analysis has shown that it is precisely the highly educated strata who have 
taken the lead in this behavioral change. In fact, a great deal of the overall increase in 
childlessness among young adults is due to the upgraded educational composition 
of the population. We argue that major educational improvements in the past did not 
have a comparable impact on the timing of motherhood because they were focused 
on the universalization of primary education. In contrast, the more recent expansion 
of secondary education, and of college education in particular, is becoming a 
powerful force in restructuring the transition to adulthood and, consequently, the 
process of family formation (Grant, and Furstenberg, 2007). Yet in some countries, 
there is more to delayed fertility than a shift in the educational distribution of the 
population. In Nicaragua, Mexico, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Panama, for example, 
we have documented significant changes in the proportion of mothers within 
educational strata or, more precisely, within the college-educated group.
The multivariate analysis of a recent survey across 14 Latin American countries 
also reveals that high educational attainment is the most influential factor predicting 
childlessness among women of all ages. Hence, although our data do not allow us 
to link the recent increase in childlessness at young adulthood to “post-materialist” 
values (Lesthaeghe, and Moors, 1995; van de Kaa, 2001), such as the search for 
individual autonomy or gender equality, the fact that highly educated women are 
the main protagonists of the observed trend points towards a change in values and 
competing life priorities that discourage early childbearing.
It is not certain whether a delayed childbearing pattern will spread across 
the entire population. Latin America continues to display some of the highest 
levels of inequality in the world (Portes, and Hoffman, 2003), and the social 
processes that bring about family change in different social strata remain quite 
is latin america starting to retreat from early anD universal chilDbearing?238
heterogeneous. Furthermore, the large socioeconomic divide that characterizes 
many Latin American societies may act as an insurmountable barrier against the 
diffusion of social values regarding family, parenthood, and the optimal calendar 
for adulthood transitions. Yet it seems clear that the social imperative of early 
motherhood that prevailed during most of the 20th century has started to 
weaken, and that we are witnessing an increasing de-standardization of the life 
course.
There are multiple areas in which this research could be expanded in the future. 
One logical extension is to test cohort differentials regarding the timing and the 
determinants of the transition to motherhood within a life course framework, 
using retrospective birth histories from survey data. The problem is that, since 
childbearing postponement is an emerging trend, it might be visible only in 
recent data, and not many Latin American countries have conducted demographic 
surveys in recent years. An additional direction for analysis would be to examine 
the prevalence and correlates of childlessness among men, since socio-cultural 
expectations and competing opportunities shaping attitudes, decisions, and 
fertility behavior are fundamentally gendered. 
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